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The article argues that the facticity of the human rights impacts of economic globalisation increasingly 
undermines the normativity of the state-centred conception of international human rights law. The 
exposure of the international legal order of states to the operations of global business entities leads to a 
collusion of sovereign state interest and globalised corporate power at the expense of protecting the 
rights of victims of human rights violations. The article scrutinises two prominent attempts to address 
this lacuna of protection: transnational tort litigation and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. It is argued that both approaches are not only an expression of the present crisis of 
international human rights law but also risk contributing to its perpetuation. While the ‘escape into 
tort’ results in the privatisation of public human rights in the global market economy, the UN Guiding 
Principles entrench their territorialisation in the state legal order in the face of global economic 
challenges. The concluding section reflects on the future pathways of international human rights law 
by positing a choice between, on the one hand, a more radical departure from human rights’ state-
centred heritage and, on the other hand, a transformation of the international legal order of states by 
virtue of human rights. It highlights the importance of extraterritorial human rights obligations in 
recovering the state’s legal accountability for human rights violations committed in the course of 
global business operations. 
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1. Human Rights and Business* 
The past decade has seen an increasing public awareness of the detrimental impacts of global business 
operations on international human rights protection. The devastating effects of oil-drilling and gas-
flaring activities by Europe and U.S.-based multi-national corporations on people and habitat in Africa 
and South-America are well-known and make the news at fairly regular intervals. Something similar 
may be said for human rights violations committed by private military contractors to protect foreign 
investment, or for the land-grabbing, environmental degradation and displacement of indigenous 
people involved in major infrastructure projects led by international consortiums. As people in the 
developed world become increasingly concerned about child labour and health and safety conditions 
in, say, the global textile and microchip industry, some businesses in developing and under-developed 
countries build new ‘showcase factories’ within easy reach of large airports to pacify international 
observers and satisfy enlightened Western consumer interest. Human rights defenders and trade union 
activists tirelessly expose best and worst corporate practices in the most remote corners of the globe, 
banks advertise with new socially responsible investment strategies, corporations pledge to codes of 
conduct saturated with human rights commitments, and states undertake to better educate ‘their’ 
businesses in human rights matters when operating abroad. In short, ‘business and human rights’ is on 
the march, not the least due to the influential work of Professor John Ruggie who was appointed 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business entities (SRSG) in 2005. 
The SRSG was tasked to, inter alia, ‘identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for TNCs [transnational corporations] and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights’; and ‘elaborate on the role of states in effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of 
TNCs and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, including through international 
cooperation’.1 In the course of his mandate that culminated in a set of Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles) endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in June 
2011,
2
 the SRSG collected rich empirical evidence of the cross-cutting and trans-boundary nature of 
the business and human rights challenge: while business operations can impact on virtually all 
internationally recognised human rights across the civil/political – social/economic/cultural divide, 
states need to mainstream human rights concerns into all business-related legal and policy domains, 
both internally and externally. To meet this challenge, the SRSG developed a ‘protect, respect, 
remedy’ framework of complementary and interlocking human rights duties and responsibilities of 
states and business entities structured around three pillars: the state duty to protect human rights 
against violations by corporations through appropriate policies, regulation, adjudication and 
enforcement measures; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, meaning to act with due 
diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others; and greater access by victims to effective 
remedies, both judicial and non-judicial, for corporate human rights violations. 
This contribution argues that whereas the SRSG has been remarkably successful in forging a new 
political allegiance between states, business entities and civil society organisations to attend to the 
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‘business and human rights predicament’,3 the UN Guiding Principles are also the expression of a 
persisting failure of the international community to address the root causes of this predicament in 
international law itself. In a nutshell, the exposure of the international legal order of states to the 
operations of global business entities leads to a collusion of sovereign state interest and globalised 
corporate power to the detriment of victims of human rights violations. This collusion is rooted in a 
tension between the global human rights impacts of states’ business-related domestic and foreign 
policies and their sovereign territorial rights to independently conduct their domestic and foreign 
affairs. On the one hand, global business operations privatise and de-territorialise the human rights 
impacts of state action. On the other hand, international law fails to address these impacts because it 
confines human rights obligations to public and territorial states. The limitations of the state-centred 
conception of international human rights law are clearly visible in the SRSG’s approach to business 
and human rights. Whereas the traditional preoccupation of human rights with protecting individuals 
against the public power of the state is increasingly overshadowed by concerns about private power 
that coalesces around global business entities, the SRSG’s ‘corporate responsibility to respect’ lacks 
binding legal effect as ‘respecting rights is not an obligation that current international human rights 
law generally imposes on companies’.4 Relatedly, the SRSG’s own research shows that today the vast 
majority of corporate human rights violations is committed in under-developed and developing 
countries by business entities that are based in, and remain controlled from, states in the developed 
world.
5
 Yet the UN Guiding Principles confine the ‘state duty to protect’ to violations committed on 
the state’s territory as its extraterritorial application remains ‘unsettled’ in international law.6  
Section two sketches out two consequences of the exposure of the international legal order of states 
to the operations of global business entities: the erosion of the substance of legal authority that states 
wield over their territory; and the expansion of state power beyond their borders. Section three revisits 
the ‘Bhopal tragedy’ to illustrate how these developments result in a legal disempowerment of victims 
of human rights violations. Sections four and five argue that prominent attempts to address this lacuna 
of protection – the vindication of human rights values through trans-national tort litigation and the 
transition from territorialised human rights law to global human rights governance – are as much an 
expression of the present crisis of international human rights law as they contribute to its perpetuation. 
While the escape into tort propels the privatisation of human rights in the global market economy, the 
turn to governance entrenches their legal territorialisation within the state in the face of global 
economic challenges. The concluding section reflects on the future pathways of international human 
rights law by positing a choice between, on the one hand, a more radical departure from human rights’ 
state-centred heritage and, on the other hand, a transformation of the international legal order of states 
by virtue of human rights. It highlights the importance of extraterritorial human rights obligations in 
recovering the state’s legal accountability for human rights violations committed in the course of 
global business operations. 
  
                                                     
3
 Indeed, the endorsement of the Guiding Principles by the UN Human Rights Council marks that first time that UN 
member states have agreed on a common position laying down standards of expected behaviour from business in relation 
to human rights. 
4
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Framework, UN Doc A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010) para. 4. 
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2. The International Legal Order of States and the Challenge of Corporate Power 
Early on in his mandate, the SRSG defined the challenge that the operations of global business entities 
pose to the international protection of human rights: 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance gaps 
created by globalisation – between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the 
capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the 
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning 




If read in isolation, this account of the corporate challenge may suggest that globalisation simply 
‘happens’ to the state and its (domestic and international) human rights law.8 The relationship between 
the ‘scope and impact of economic forces and actors’ and the ‘capacity of societies to manage their 
adverse consequences’ appears asymmetrical: globalisation ‘creates’ governance gaps and ‘provides’ 
the permissive environment in which corporations violate human rights. This resonates with broader 
narratives that associate economic globalisation – the increased interdependency of public and private 
actors across national-territorial borders brought about by global economic cooperation and 
competition
9
 – with the demise of the sovereign state.10 From a domestic point of view, economic 
globalisation erodes the substance of legal authority that states wield over their territory. Global 
business operations escape the regulatory grasp of territorial states while at the same time limiting 
states’ ability ‘to set the social, economic and political agenda within their respective political space’, 
and therewith their capacity ‘to secure the livelihoods of their respective citizens by narrowing the 
parameters of legitimate state action’.11 Internationally, economic globalisation transforms states’ 
external relations with each other. As de Feyter says, ‘companies that organise across borders define 
the primary role of a state in terms of creating a space for the play of market forces. Not only should a 
state adopt a market-based system within its own territory ..., the same system should apply to 
economic relationships among countries’.12 Economic globalisation asserts pressure on developed 
states to create a global ‘level playing field’ for their corporate nationals by further dismantling legal 
barriers to the free flow of capital, production and labour in the developing world. At the same time, 
developing states will be reluctant to raise national standards of social and environmental protection 
for fear of losing their competitive advantage in attracting foreign investment in the global market.  
Granted that global business entities are important agents of economic globalisation, it would 
nevertheless be reductive to simply characterise the business and human rights predicament as a 
corporate takeover of the international legal order of states. Arguably, the rise of corporate power 
                                                     
7
 H. R. C., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 
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relationship between economic globalisation and the state-centred conception of international human rights law, see K. de 
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 C. Thomas, ‘International financial institutions and social and economic rights: an exploration’, in T. Evans (ed.), Human 
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transforms, rather than marginalises, the role of sovereign states in the global market economy.
13
 
(Constituent parts of) global business entities continue to operate in the shadow of the territorial state 
legal order. ‘Multi-national’ corporations remain subject to the domestic laws of the states in which 
they reside, and often rely on these laws for the regulation and enforcement of their business 
transactions. Moreover, rules on extraterritorial jurisdiction under public and private international law 
can tie globalised corporate power back to the regulatory authority of the territorial state.
14
 Hence, as 
Robert Wai perceptively notes, debates on (extra-) territorial corporate regulation will often turn less 
on whether the state should or could regulate than on what interests should be regulated: 
Predictably, the same parties which advocate an active governmental role in defending strong 
property rights and contractual enforcement in new areas of intellectual property and e-commerce 
across borders are often equally concerned to argue that governments not ‘interfere’ with the 
development and freedom of these realms through laws that regulate with respect to matters such 
as taxation, content (including pornographic and racist material), viewership, or the like.
15
 
The flip side of this transformation of the role of the state is that increased global economic 
cooperation and competition enables governments to utilise the (legal) control they continue to 
exercise over their corporate nationals at home and abroad to assert power beyond their borders. The 
operations of global business entities amplify the impacts of states’ business-related domestic laws and 
policies on individuals in other states.
16
 Moreover, they enhance states’ opportunities to use their 
corporate nationals to pursue foreign policy objectives.
17
 Consider by way of example the recent U.S. 
government approach to ‘economic statecraft’: 
In increasingly competitive and dynamic circumstances, the U.S. government recognises the 
valuable contributions that the private sector can make in promoting key U.S. foreign policy 
objectives, including economic inclusion, respect for labour and human rights, and environmental 
protection. The State Department is using all the tools at its disposal to support U.S. economic 
priorities, which at the same time foster global peace, stability, security and prosperity. In part, that 
means crafting policies that help create – and sustain the growth of – well-paying, productive 
American private sector jobs. It means elevating and updating commercial diplomacy to attract 
investment in America and ensure U.S. companies can invest on fair terms in overseas markets. 
Running throughout much of the economic statecraft agenda is the need to identify and respond to 
a set of strategic challenges posed by state capitalism, including the ability and willingness of 
some states to distort markets to achieve strategic aims.
18
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 Muchlinski, for instance, suggests that economic globalisation diffuses the traditional state-centred focus of international 
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18
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In short: states have an economic self-interest in supporting the global operations of their corporate 
nationals, which combines with their political self-interest in using corporate power to pursue their 
foreign policy objectives, including the protection of human rights.  
At first sight, one may find little fault in states using corporate power to promote human rights in 
other states. However, the underlying ‘business case’ for human rights that is advanced in response to 
economic globalisation in effect risks surrendering the state-centred conception of international human 
rights law to the ‘laws’ of the global market.19 The global human rights impacts of states’ ‘privatised’ 
domestic and foreign policies de facto undermine the principle of state sovereignty that once justified 
the territorialisation of human rights in the state legal order. At the same time, these human rights 
impacts are not mitigated by corresponding state obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of 
third-country victims of corporate power. Rather, state sovereignty resurfaces in shielding public 
authorities from de lege accountability for human rights violations committed by (constituent parts of) 
their corporate nationals in other states. Hence, below the surface of ‘governance gaps’ lies another 
‘business and human rights predicament’ that is rooted in the interrelation of the international legal 
order of states with the global market economy and that unleashes the human rights impacts of global 
business operations from the constraining force of international human rights law. From Colombia to 
the Philippines, the crisis of international human rights law is the crisis of the victims in ‘weak’ host 
states of corporate investment that lack the capacity (and at times also the willingness) to protect 
human rights against business operations conducted with the active support or passive connivance of 
‘strong’ home state governments. 
3. Bhopal 
The Indian city of Bhopal is remembered for one of the worst industrial accidents in recent human 
history that killed some 10.000 people and left more than 500.000 injured – estimates vary. Today, 
‘Bhopal’ has become a paradigmatic example of the challenges that the operations of global business 
entities pose to the international protection of human rights.
20
 In the night of 2/3 December 1984, a 
chemical plant operated by Union Carbide of India Limited (UCIL), a corporation jointly owned by 
the U.S.-based Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and the Indian government, leaked massive 
amounts of toxic gas after water and other impurities had entered one of the plant’s methyl isocyanate 
(MIC) storage tanks.
21
 Before starting business in India, UCC had negotiated an exemption from 
Indian law limiting foreign investment in Indian corporations in order to acquire a controlling interest 
(50.9 %) in UCIL. While the course of events that led to the contamination of the tank remains 
contested, it transpired that UCC’s centralised control- and decision-making powers over its Indian 
subsidiary did not translate into a diligent management of the plant necessary for its safe operation.
22
 
A series of previous incidents and operational surveys suggest that UCC was aware of major safety 
hazards at the plant site. Moreover, there is evidence that the operational and safety standards at 
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 On the emerging market contingency of international human rights law see P. Alston, ‘The myopia of handmaidens: 
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Bhopal were considerably lower than those employed in another UCC plant located in West Virginia, 
United States.
23
 Unlike in the U.S., there was a mismatch between the Indian plant’s high production 
capacity and low processing capacity of MIC, resulting in the storage of large quantities of the toxic 
substance over long periods of time. Parts of the technology transferred by UCC were allegedly not 
proven and the tank’s cooling system, as well as the monitoring of the plant’s instruments and 
processes, did not live up to the Virginia standards. Cost-cutting measures implemented one year prior 
to the accident further eroded the safety standards. If the training of staff had always been poor, skilled 
workers were now replaced by cheap labour and specialised personnel were moved around the plant to 
compensate for the shortage in manpower. Whereas the Virginia plant had a sophisticated emergency 
plan and system in place to alert public authorities and local communities of toxic emissions, in 
Bhopal a loud siren and MIC clouds arriving over the working class neighbourhoods built up to the 
factory walls did the job.  
To the present day, the Bhopal tragedy stands out on two accounts: a massive and large-scale 
violation of human rights implicating one of the most powerful chemical multi-nationals; and a 
pervasive failure of the victims to obtain effective redress in India as well as in the United States. The 
gas leakage directly impaired, at a minimum, the Bhopal inhabitants’ right to life and physical 
integrity, their rights to health and an adequate standard of living, their right to freedom from 
discrimination (particularly on grounds of gender), and their right to an effective remedy. Estimates of 
the death toll in the immediate aftermath of the leakage range from 2000 to 7000 people, and many 
more were to die in the weeks to come. Two thirds of the total population of Bhopal was affected by 
the toxic gas,
24
 with many incurring chronic and debilitating diseases treatment of which often proved 
ineffective. The environmental pollution emanating from the plant before, during, and after the gas 
leakage had further adverse effects on people’s enjoyment of their human rights. In a judgment of May 
2004, the Supreme Court of India stated that as a consequence of ‘indiscriminate dumping of 
hazardous waste due to non-existent or negligent practices together with lack of enforcement by the 
authorities, the groundwater, and, therefore, drinking water supplies have been damaged’.25 The gas 
leakage and environmental pollution disproportionately affected the poorest and most vulnerable parts 
of the population. As an Amnesty International report concludes, ‘it is clear that the gas leak radically 
altered the social fabric and economics of everyday life, and entrenched existing poverty and social 
disempowerment.’26  
The scale and gravity of the human rights violations committed at Bhopal stands in sharp contrast 
with the inability of the victims to obtain effective redress. As Baxi says, the subsequent legal 
proceedings in the United States and India led to a ‘re-victimisation of the Bhopal victims’ as they 
failed to produce any determination of the cause of the catastrophe; any declaration of legal liability; 
and ‘any compensation/damages based on access to all relevant information about the post-catastrophe 
past, present, and future of men, women and children colonized by the MIC and related toxic 
substances’.27 Having regard to UCIL’s limited assets and concerned about the capacities of the Indian 
judicial system to handle a case of such magnitude, the victims and the Indian government opted for 
suing the U.S. parent corporation (UCC) in the United States. The U.S. District Court dismissed the 
lawsuit on grounds of forum non conveniens on the condition that UCC submitted to the jurisdiction of 
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 Amnesty International (n 21) 18. 
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Tripathi Pvt. Ltd: 1990) i, ii-iii. 




 The ensuing lengthy and protracted litigation in India confirmed the plaintiffs’ 
concerns about the inadequacy of the Indian forum. With the ‘Bhopal Act’,29 the Indian government 
assumed the exclusive right to litigate on behalf of the victims, and initiated proceedings in the District 
Court of Bhopal in September 1986.
30
 Before the Indian court, UCC contested that there was ‘a 
concept known to law as “multi-national corporation”’, and that it had any decisive influence over 
what it considered a domestic enterprise (UCIL) regulated and controlled by the Indian public 
authorities.
31
 The case was never judged on its merits. Instead, in two orders of 14 and 15 February 
1989, the Indian Supreme Court approved an out-of-court settlement between UCC and the Indian 
government concluded without participation of the victims.
32
 The terms of the settlement order 
repudiated UCC’s putative legal liability and bestowed upon the multi-national corporation without 
legal personality (UCC; UCIL; Union Carbide Eastern, Hong Kong; all of their subsidiaries and 
affiliates; and each of their present and former directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, 
attorneys, advocates, and solicitors) sweeping legal immunities for all past, present and future claims, 
causes of action and civil and criminal proceedings vis-à-vis all Indian citizens and all public and 
private entities. Attempts of victims’ representatives to overturn the settlement in Indian and U.S. 
courts failed.  
From the late 90s to the present, a multitude of further ‘Bhopal’ cases have been brought in U.S. 
courts – thus far with little success.33 In June 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
put an end to a decade of tort litigation against UCC in an attempt to recover from injuries caused by 
exposure to soil and drinking water polluted by hazardous wastes emanating from the UCIL plant.
34
 
The Court recognised that plaintiffs ‘may well have suffered terrible and lasting injuries from a wholly 
preventable disaster for which someone is responsible.’35 Yet, while it was ‘beyond dispute that UCIL 
generated and disposed of the waste which allegedly polluted Plaintiffs’ drinking water’,36 the court 
found insufficient evidence to hold UCC either directly or indirectly liable for the damage.
37
 In 
February 2001, UCC had become a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dow Chemical Company (Dow). 
Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, UCC did not face at the time of the merger, and was not expected 
to face in the future, any civil, criminal or administrative charges, which, individually or cumulatively, 
were ‘reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on it’.38 While Dow regrets the Bhopal 
‘tragedy’, it cannot accept responsibility for UCC’s undischarged liabilities to which it had ‘no 
connection’, as it must strongly object on grounds of ‘principles of the rule of law, due process and 
fundamental fairness’ to attempts of the Indian government to re-open the 1989 settlement: ‘The 
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Government’s ill-advised action puts at peril the image of India as a nation committed to promoting 
and adhering to accepted legal principles and the rule of law, with the inevitable result that confidence 
in investing in India will be undermined.’39 
4. The ‘Escape’ into Tort 
Dow’s insistence on ‘due process’ and the ‘rule of law’ serves as a useful reminder that the state of 
India was implicated in Bhopal not only in its capacity as a party to a private tort litigation, but also in 
its capacity as a public and political institution acting in the name and on behalf of the people of India. 
Indeed, given the significant role the acts and omissions on the part of India and the United States 
played in the fate of the victims, it would be mistaken to simply shrug off Bhopal as a corporate 
disaster. Before the U.S. and Indian courts, UCC alleged joined liability of the Indian government, the 
State of Madhya Pradesh and the Municipality of Bhopal for having authorised the design, 
construction and operation of the plant without proper assessment of its hazardous nature and the 
safety measures provided; for having allowed residential slums to develop around the plant site; and 
for having failed to implement and enforce existing health, safety and environmental regulations, 
amongst others because the public agencies in charge were seriously understaffed.
40
 The Indian state 
also contributed to inhibiting victims’ access to justice. The government’s Bhopal Act – initially 
justified on grounds of ensuring their quick and equitable compensation – in effect deprived victims of 
their right to sue and was later challenged in the Supreme Court of India for violating their 
constitutional rights.
41
 The 1989 settlement concluded without their participation impeded the victims’ 
quest to hold those responsible legally to account – for the mutual benefit of UCC that never admitted 
to legal liability and the Indian state that did not see its own regulatory failures exposed. The United 
States, in turn, did nothing to regulate, control and adjudicate activities of UCC on its own territory in 
relation to the Bhopal plant. The U.S.-based parent corporation had designed the plant on U.S. soil, 
had furnished it with allegedly dangerous technology from the U.S., and had failed to equip it with 
safety standards comparable to those at its Virginia production site. Moreover, it was UCC’s 
headquarters in Connecticut that directed the operations of its Indian subsidiary; that determined the 
corporation’s overall policy; and that took the key strategic decisions, including those that led to the 
implementation of cost-cutting measures at Bhopal one year prior to the industrial accident.
42
 Finally, 
it was the U.S.-based parent corporation that cut the settlement deal with the Indian state for the 
benefit of the whole corporate group, which U.S. courts later refused to review on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
Despite the considerable involvement of Indian and U.S. public authorities in the industrial 
accident that seriously impaired Indian citizens’ enjoyment of their human rights, Bhopal does not 
easily lend itself to a human rights law analysis. That is to say, while Bhopal illustrates the potential 
and pitfalls of private litigation in vindicating interests and values embodied in human rights such as 
health or physical integrity,
43
 it is less obvious what human rights law has to contribute to Bhopal. The 
public and territorial limitations of the state-centred conception of international human rights law 
translate into a corresponding paramountcy of private and trans-national tort litigation, leaving victims 
                                                     
39
 The Dow Chemical Company, Dow will Object to Government of India’s Request to Reopen Bhopal Settlement (28 
February 2011), http://www.dow.com. 
40
 See Muchlinski (n 22) 575-78; Deva (n 20), with further references. 
41
 Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480. 
42
 Deva (n 20) 28.  
43
 In this sense Deva, who argues that ‘human rights, or at least the underlying interests, could be protected through non-
human rights laws’ including tort, and notwithstanding the conceptual differences between them, see Deva (n 20) 34. 
The Crisis of International Human Rights Law in the Global Market Economy 
9 
with little other hope for effective redress.
44
 The fact that the principal protagonists of the tragedy – a 
corporation that causes damage to natural persons as injured parties – were private actors seems to 
entail that the shortcomings in public regulation should be subsumed to a ‘massive tort’. Moreover, the 
fact that the industrial accident implicated a ‘multi-national’ corporation seems to suggest that 
jurisdictional conflicts between public courts fall exclusively within the domain of private 
international law. However, and apart from the legal-doctrinal hurdles and practical problems (most 
prominently money, time and evidence) that victims litigating against global business entities have to 
overcome, as abundantly illustrated by Bhopal, there are weighty normative reasons against 
assimilating or reducing public human rights to private tort. The ‘escape’ into tort propels the 
privatisation of human rights in the global market economy and severs their connection to the public 
good once vested in the sovereign state legal order. At the same time, states’ insistence on their 
sovereign territorial rights impede victims quest for justice via trans-national tort litigation. 
It is debatable whether the rationale of, and remedies provided by, tort law can fully do justice to 
human rights. Its focus on monetary compensation for damages caused to persons and property can 
vindicate some, but certainly not all, fundamental interests protected by human rights law. At the same 
time, tort law generally only vindicates those interests that are quantifiable in monetary terms. One 
reason why tort law is both attractive to redress corporate harm to human rights and unattractive to 
redress corporate harm to human rights is that it mimics the logic of market transactions.
45
 If the 
corporate business case for human rights is thought to rest on maximising shareholder ‘value’ (read: 
profit),
46
 the monetary compensation of ‘stakeholders’ (read: victims) appears an appropriate remedy. 
However, and put crudely, this transmutation of human rights violations into pecuniary damages risks 
to render corporate respect for human rights contingent on the financial losses incurred in their 
violation, which may falsely suggest that human rights were just another market commodity – for sale 
at the highest bid. From there it is but a small step to surrendering the inviolability of human dignity, 
the categorical prohibition of torture, or the protection of freedom of expression as ‘one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society’47 to a litmus test of their market-friendliness. Yet, while 
for corporate perpetrators, human rights violations pay off all too often, for the victims the suffering 
involved in the violation of their most fundamental interests is something that money cannot offset. 
Below the surface of this ‘value for money’ problem lingers an ethical and political concern with the 
proclaimed ‘equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’.48 As Anderson says, the 
problem with ‘tort-based approaches to valuation’ that treat human injury and death ‘as a cost of 
production’ is that 
[o]ur ethical understanding of human life is not purely market-based. There is another legal 
principle at work, which is based on the sanctity of human life and the idea that each human being 




The privatisation and trans-nationalisation of human rights through tort is meant to remedy the 
shortcomings of their legal compartmentalisation within and between sovereign state entities. Yet this 
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remedy is bought at the price of demoting the public and political thrust of human rights law into a 
private and ‘bilateral’ relationship between victim and tortfeasor.50 Moreover, this approach obscures 
the way in which public human rights law (ought to) reign over private litigation. It is one (important) 
concern whether, as alleged by UCC during the Bhopal litigation, the Indian government should be 
held liable in tort for its own regulatory failures. It is quite a different concern what obligations 
international human rights law imposes on India and the United States to respect, protect, and fulfil the 
rights of the Bhopal victims. 
Territorial state sovereignty resurfaces in the domestication of private international law that inhibits 
victims’ access to justice in home states of corporate operations. As Muir Watt says, 
[i]t is through the assertion of territoriality as a governing principle that private international law 
has been complicit in preventing the assertion of transnational corporate social responsibility. It 
has kept corporate liability within the limits of compartmentalised, local law through both forum 
non conveniens and the lex loci delicti.
51
 
Before the U.S. District Court, the Bhopal victims contended that UCC was a ‘monolithic 
multinational’ which ‘controlled the design, construction and operation of the Bhopal plant through its 
global network of corporate planning, direction and control’; and that the United States had a public 
interest in encouraging ‘American multinationals to protect the health and well being of peoples 
throughout the world’.52 Yet, despite the fact that the government of India had pressed for litigation in 
the United States, the U.S. District Court concurred with UCC’s view that India’s sovereign regulatory 
interest in the chemical accident and the ensuing judicial proceedings outweighed the U.S. interest in 
controlling the operations of American corporations abroad.
53
 The recent U.S Supreme Court 
judgment in Kiobel is a fine illustration of how concerns with public state sovereignty serve to curtail 
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over private conduct impairing human rights.
54
 The case was 
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATS) by Nigerian plaintiffs alleging that Anglo-Dutch Shell 
had aided and abetted the Nigerian military dictatorship in the 1990s in committing gross human rights 
violations. The Supreme Court considered that the ATS entailed a ‘presumption against extraterritorial 
application’ which could only be rebutted if ‘claims touch and concern the territory of the United 
States ... with sufficient force’.55 Mere ‘corporate presence’ of the defendant on U.S. soil is not 
enough.
56
 This presumption against extraterritoriality is to guard U.S. courts against ‘imposing the 
sovereign will of the United States on conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another 
sovereign’, which can lead to clashes between U.S. laws and the laws of other nations and result in 
‘international discord’;57 against ‘the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of 
foreign policy’, which would impinge ‘on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in 
managing foreign affairs’;58 and against putting U.S. citizens at risk of equally being dragged into 
foreign courts for human rights violations ‘occurring in the United States or anywhere else in the 
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world’.59 In a rabbit-duck switch, global business entities reappear in (international) law as multi-
national corporations subject to the sovereign territorial rights of the state. As the UK and Dutch 
governments submitted to the Supreme Court in Kiobel in support of their ‘corporate national’, 
[t]he Governments’ policy is that companies should behave with respect for the human rights of 
people in countries where they do business. They also believe that the most fair and effective way 
to achieve progress in this area is through multilateral agreement on standards, achieved through 
multilateral cooperation with other States, and then the effective national implementation of those 
standards. It is then for countries to regulate and control business operations in their territories to 
ensure they meet the implemented standards.
60
 
5. The Turn to Governance 
The weakness of the state-centred conception of international human rights law in addressing the 
human rights impacts of global business operations also manifests itself in the transition in much of 
the recent business and human rights debate from territorialised human rights law to global human 
rights governance. The language of ‘governance gaps created by economic globalisation’ coupled with 
an appeal to states’ ‘policy rationales’ to ‘promote’ human rights in relation to global business entities 
gives a face lift to governments’ persistent refusal to accept legal accountability for human rights 
violations committed by their corporate nationals abroad.
 61
 Absent a clear recognition of legal state 
obligations to protect human rights against extraterritorial corporate abuse, the debate shifts from 
third-country victims’ (putative) entitlements to have their rights respected, protected and fulfilled as 
provided by international human rights law to states’ policy rationales to protect human rights in their 
external relations. At the same time, states’ rebuttal of extraterritorial human rights obligations is but 
the mirror image of their insistence to independently conduct their domestic and foreign policies as a 
matter of sovereign territorial right. In this vein, the German government contended before the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Kiobel (citing to US jurisprudence) that the ‘projection of U.S. laws into foreign 
countries’ creates ‘serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate 
its own commercial affairs’.62 As in the case of the recent U.S. government’s approach to ‘economic 
statecraft’,63 the subsequent move to reconcile human rights and economic objectives under the 
umbrella of a ‘business case’ for human rights barely conceals that these objectives will often conflict 
with each other, and that (developed and underdeveloped) states will have very different views on how 
such conflicts should be resolved.
64
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The UN Guiding Principles highlight the problematique of human rights violations in the ‘state-
business nexus’ that concurrently implicate public and territorial states and private and globally 
operating business entities: 
States should take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises 
that are owed or controlled by the state, or that receive substantial support and services from state 
agencies such as export credit agencies and official investment insurance or guarantee agencies, 
including, where appropriate, by requiring human rights due diligence.
65
 
The commentary to this provision recognises that ‘where a business enterprise is controlled by the 
state, or where its acts can be attributed otherwise to the state, an abuse of human rights by the 
business enterprise may entail a violation of the state’s own international law obligations’.66 This 
tentative language of legal obligations is bolstered by an appeal to states’ reputational, prudential, and 
business-related ‘policy rationales’ for ensuring that corporations respect human rights. Moreover, the 
Guiding Principles stress that a failure of home states to prevent and redress corporate harm outside 
their territory may ‘add to the human rights challenges faced by the recipient state’, that is the host 
state of corporate investment.
67
 Yet, crucially, these human rights challenges faced by the host state 
are not met with corresponding human rights obligations of the home state to protect third-country 
victims against corporate violations. There are 
[s]trong policy reasons for home states to set out clearly the expectation that businesses respect 
human rights abroad, especially when the State itself is involved in or supports those businesses. 
The reasons include ensuring predictability for business enterprises by providing coherent and 
consistent messages, and preserving the State’s own reputation.
68
 
However, home states are ‘not generally required under international law to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they 
generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognised jurisdictional basis.’69 The assertion 
that states are neither ‘generally required’ nor ‘generally prohibited’ to regulate business operations 
outside their territories shapes the SRSG’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Guiding 
Principles focus on the permissibility of the extraterritorial exercise of (legislative, judicial and 
executive) state authority in accordance with a recognised basis of jurisdiction under public 
international law. What is at issue is the competence of states, as delimited by general international 
law, to assert authority over conduct not exclusively of domestic concern. Relatedly, the Guiding 
Principles are primarily concerned with the territorial location and/or nationality of the business entity 
as the perpetrator of extra-territorial human rights violations. The inquiry thus turns on whether a state 
can exercise jurisdiction over corporate actors violating human rights abroad because they reside 
within the state’s territory (the territoriality principle) and/or because they can be considered 
‘corporate nationals’ of that state (the nationality principle).70  
However, the question whether states are permitted to assert extraterritorial authority over 
corporate perpetrators of human rights violations is not reducible to the question whether they are 
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obligated to protect third-country victims against corporate violations.
71
 Otherwise, a state could 
circumvent its obligations under international human rights treaties by exceeding its jurisdictional 
competences under public international law. Whereas extraterritorial jurisdiction in general 
international law is a function of state sovereignty and concerns the state’s entitlement to exercise 
jurisdiction abroad,
72
 extraterritorial jurisdiction under international human rights treaties is a function 
of protecting the rights of the individual and concerns the state’s obligations when exercising 
jurisdiction abroad. And what matters for the purpose of the latter is not the state’s de lege competence 
but its assertion of de facto power and control over an area or individual outside its territory. As the 
European Court of Human Rights held in Loizidou v Turkey, ‘the responsibility of a Contracting Party 
could also arise when as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises 
effective control of an area outside its national territory.
73
 Similarly, for the UN Human Rights 
Committee, ‘a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the [International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)] to anyone within [its] power or effective control ..., even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party … and regardless of the circumstances in which such 
power or effective control was obtained’.74 And according to the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, ‘any person subject to [a state’s] jurisdiction’ in Article 1 of the American Convention 
of Human Rights refers to  
[c]onduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory of 
one state, but subject to the control of another state – usually through the acts of the latter’s agents 
abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence within 
a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed 
the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.
75
 
The Guiding Principles’ preoccupation with states’ competences to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
in effect privileges states’ sovereign territorial rights over the human rights entitlements of third-
country victims of global business operations. However, as in Bhopal, it is one question – often 
discussed under the heading of ‘home state’ or ‘parent-based’ regulation76 – whether the United States 
had an overriding policy interest in regulating and controlling the operations of UCC in India. It is 
quite a different question whether international human rights law imposes obligations on the United 
States to protect the rights of the Bhopal victims against violations committed by its own corporate 
national operating from its own territory. 
The ramifications of the transition from states’ territorialised legal human rights obligations to their 
policy rationales to promote human rights in relation to business operations of their corporate nationals 
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abroad are not dissimilar from those of the ‘escape’ into tort discussed in the previous section. The 
turn to governance resolves the tension between the human rights impacts of economic globalisation 
and states’ sovereign territorial rights to independently conduct their economic affairs at the expense 
of protecting the legal human rights of third-country victims against corporate violations. On the one 
hand, the global human rights impacts of home states’ domestic and foreign business-related policies 
de facto undermine the capacity of host states to protect human rights within their territorial borders. 
On the other hand, the territorialisation of human rights in the state legal order shields home states 
from de lege accountability for human rights violations committed by their corporate nationals in other 
states. This leaves victims of human rights violations in ‘weak’ host states of corporate investment at 
the goodwill of ‘strong’ home state governments and at the mercy of corporate social responsibility. 
Bhopal illustrates why – on its own – this approach is unlikely to succeed in protecting and 
indemnifying the victims. The host state of corporate operations (India) will often be unable or 
unwilling to live up to its territorial human rights obligations due to low regulatory and judicial 
capacity or collusion with business out of fear of discouraging foreign investment. These problems are 
aggravated by failures of home states to prevent and redress corporate harm to human rights outside 
their territory. Yet the home state (US) will generally have little policy incentive to regulate and 
control the human rights impacts of its corporate nationals abroad.
77
 Whereas much of the profits of 
corporate undertakings accrue on the home state’s territory, the prevention and redress of corporate 
human rights violations falls within the sovereign right and legal and political responsibility of the 
host state.  
6. International Human Rights Law at the Crossroads 
The point of the foregoing considerations is not to downplay the importance of transnational tort 
litigation in vindicating human rights values, nor is it to challenge the desirability of states 
mainstreaming human rights concerns into their business-related domestic and foreign policies. It is 
only to query how these developments reflect on the state of international human rights law in the 
global market economy. In an important contribution to the debate, Craig Scott complains about the 
tendency of lawyers to ‘organise the normative world of human rights in terms of (unduly) 
dichotomous ways of thinking’.78 On the one hand, the ‘(stylised) restrained conservative’ maintains 
that ‘international human rights standards are a matter of public law (vertical) applicability wherein 
corporate conduct is regulated through indirect state responsibility which attaches only to corporate 
harm caused within a state’s own territorial space’. On the other hand, 
[t]he (stylised) activist radical insists that international human rights standards are (not only, but) 
also a matter of private law (horizontal) applicability wherein corporate conduct may be regulated 
through direct civil liability which is capable of attaching to harm caused by corporate conduct 
outside the state’s own territorial space.
79
 
To thus construe the public and the private, and the territorial and the extraterritorial, as binary 
oppositions conceals that the relationship between ‘torture’ and ‘tort’ involves a ‘two-way normative 
traffic’ in which one system of norms becomes translated into, and accommodated within, the other.80  
There is much to commend in Scott’s analysis and his call to move beyond dichotomies to explore 
the benefits of mutual translation and cross-fertilisation between ‘torture’ and ‘tort’. However, the 
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appeal of mutual accommodation should not distract from the fact that such translations are not 
normatively innocent but driven by the exposure of the international legal order of states to the 
operations of global business entities. This path dependency explains why the human rights responses 
to economic globalisation considered in this contribution are both an expression of the present crisis of 
the state-centred conception of international human rights law and risk contributing to its perpetuation. 
The political economy of tort and private international law as applied to global business entities 
hampers the effective realisation of victims’ rights in private litigation and relegates the regulatory 
risks of private human rights harm to host countries of corporate operations often ill-equipped to 
prevent and redress violations. At the same time, the turn to global human rights governance 
reinforces the territorial constraints state sovereignty imposes on international human rights law and 
shields home states of ‘multi-national’ corporations from legal human rights accountability for 
violations committed in other states. The result is a collusion of sovereign state interest and globalised 
corporate power that disempowers victims of human rights violations in the global market economy. 
The distinction between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ that once aspired to protect the human rights of 
private individuals against the public power of the state is transformed to defend the trans-national 
economic interests of corporate rights holders against political interventions in the name of the public 
good. Relatedly, the distinction between the ‘territorial’ and the ‘extraterritorial’ that was once 
premised on the equal sovereign entitlements and responsibilities of states to protect human rights 
within their territory unleashes global market forces from the constraints of international law. 
This crisis of the state-centred conception of international human rights law – the ‘business and 
human rights predicament’ – stems less from a marginalisation of sovereign states than from a 
transformation of their international relations in the global market economy. Accordingly, as Andrew 
Clapham notes, ‘it is not simply the development of the global market, deregulation, or privatisation 
which is threatening the enjoyment of human rights; but rather, it is the ways in which governments 
are responding to these developments’.81 Let me therefore conclude by briefly sketching out two 
(again rather stylised) views on the future pathways of the state-centred conception of international 
human rights law under conditions of economic globalisation. According to one view, the collusion of 
sovereign state interest and globalised corporate power that unties the human rights impacts of global 
business operations from the human rights accountabilities of public and territorial states leads to the 
emergence of new private and trans-national human rights regimes that further undermine the 
hegemony of states’ (constitutional and international) human rights law. In a memorable lecture, Neil 
Walker has captured the tentative correlations between the rise of the global and the fall of the 
international legal order of states.
 82
 At one end of the national-international continuum, state law ‘is 
increasingly rivalled by law otherwise spatially extended, including … transnational domain-specific 
private ordering, hybrid public-private ordering and, increasingly, new forms of global legal regime 
that neither claim universality nor obviously emanate from or respect the aggregative sovereign will.’ 
At the other end of the continuum, the emergence of trans-national regimes and new forms of private 
and hybrid ordering threatens to undermine ‘the idea of a shared “public” concern joining the various 
elements of international law’.83 For some, this de-centring of law from the public and territorial state 
emplaces human rights in sectorally differentiated private and transnational regimes that claim global 
validity.
84
 However, the ensuing de-territorialisation of human rights comes at the price of their further 
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privatisation and de-politicisation in a ‘global law without a state’ that has ‘no legislation, no political 
constitution, and no politically ordered hierarchy of norms’.85 
According to another view, the collusion of sovereign state interest and globalised corporate power 
calls for a recovery of the public nature of human rights beyond the international legal order of 
territorial states. In this vein, global constitutionalism strives to compensate for negative externalities 
of economic globalisation on the territorial state and its citizenry by re-constituting public human 
rights law at the global (UN) level.
86
 However, while the attraction of a global constitutionalisation of 
human rights lies in the shortcomings of their emplacement in the sovereign state, global 
constitutionalism cannot lay claim to a political community akin to that of the state which could render 
human rights law legitimate in the light of a global public good.
87
 This discrepancy between highly 
globalised economies and weakly globalised political structures, in turn, has led to a revival of state 
sovereignty to fence off new waves of (market-driven) Western imperialism on the back of human 
rights.
88
 An arguably more promising way to address the bifurcation between the human rights impacts 
of global business operations and the territorial limitations of the state-centred conception of 
international human rights law is the recognition of extraterritorial state obligations to protect the 
human rights of third-country victims against corporate violations. For more than a decade now, the 
UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies have called upon state parties to regulate and control their ‘corporate 
nationals’ to prevent human rights violations in third countries, and to ensure effective redress in 
home-state courts of corporate operations. For instance, in its early General Comment No. 14 
concerning the right to health, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that ‘to 
comply with their international obligations in relation to Article 12, States parties have to respect the 
enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violating the right 
in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.’89 With regard to 
the right to water, the same Committee called upon states parties ‘to prevent their own citizens and 
companies from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries … 
[w]here States parties can take steps to influence other third parties to respect the right, through legal 
or political means.’90 The Committee’s more recent General Comment on social security provides that 
‘state parties should extraterritorially protect the right to social security by preventing their own 
citizens and national entities from violating this right in other countries’.91 The other UN Treaty 
Bodies,
92
 as well as the recent Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
93
 express similar views.  
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The ‘governance gaps’ in business and human rights identified by the SRSG are but symptoms of a 
deeper crisis of the state-centred conception of international human rights law in coming to terms with 
the human rights impacts of economic globalisation. The operations of global business entities 
effectuate an increasing bifurcation between, on the one hand, territory-based forms of public legal 
authority that lose their regulatory grasp over global developments and, on the other hand, a 
privatisation and de-territorialisation of legally unfettered state power in the coattails and the service 
of the market. Extraterritorial human rights obligations can contribute to redressing the ensuing 
collusion of sovereign state interest and globalised corporate power by legally empowering third-
country victims of human rights violations committed by private and globally operating business 
entities with the passive acquiescence or active support of public and territorial states. John Ruggie 
(the former SRSG) intervened in Kiobel warning that should Shell succeed in ‘destroy[ing] an entire 
juridical edifice for redressing gross violations of human rights … its road back to the corporate social 
responsibility fold will be long and hard.’94 Home states of global business entities should begin 
pondering the corresponding challenge: so long as they refuse to accept legal accountability for the 
global human rights impacts of their business-related domestic and foreign policies, there remains the 
nagging suspicion that the new business and human rights talk is but the old emperor with new 
clothes. Honi soit qui mal y pense. 
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